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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD K. BEECHER AND 
ASSOCIATES, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORP. AND 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Suit by architect Beecher for additional fees claimed 
to be owed for extra architectural services and ex-
penses for Metropolitan Hall of Justice complex result-
ing from (a) change by Defendants to spread-out type 
structure after architect Beecher had worked for 10 
months on a high-rise concept, and (b) increase of 2% 
times in construction time resulting from later decision 
of Defendants to build project in two phases rather than 
as a single project. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was scheduled for trial January 12, 1973, 
(R. 211), was re-scheduled for February 22, 1973, (R. 
235), was pre-tried February 22, 1973, at which time the 
Court indicated that the case would be tried within a 
Case No. 
13610 
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week or two, and scheduled a trial date for March 7, 
1973, (R. 309). A further pre-trial conference was held 
.March. 5, 1973, not reported — R. 309). No further 
headings occurred (although requested by Beeches) 
until immediately before Judge Wilkins resigned as a 
judge when Judge Wilkins granted summary judgment 
dismissing Plaintiff's claims, although no motion for 
summary judgment was filed. A transcript of the pre-
trial hearings held 10 months earlier was not available 
at the time that summary judgment was ordered. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Reversal of summary judgment of dismissal and 
remand for trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff Beecher incorporates by reference the 
statement of facts contained in it's original brief herein 
(P. 2-5). 
The statement of facts contained in Defendants' 
brief includes considerable argument, and is inaccurate 
in many particulars, however since their statement of 
alleged facts is 13 pages long, much of which is im-
material to the issues involved in this appeal, Plaintiff 
Beecher will not attempt a detailed answer thereto, 
except to the extent that they are answered in respond-
ing to individual points raised by Defendants. However, 
a few general comments may be helpful to understand 
the basic problems. 
Defendants indicate (pages 3 and 4 of Defendants' 
brief) that since the Defendants changed their minds 
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as to the type of structure that they desired (after 
architect Beecher had worked for 10 months under the 
the direction of Defendants' agent designing a high-rise 
building) that they could simply refuse to approve that 
work and avoid payment. The contract expressly re-
quires payment by Defendants for abandoned work. 
(See discussion on page 4 of Plaintiff's original brief 
and R. 29, Par. #4). 
Defendants' incorrectly claim (Pages 4 and 5 of 
brief) they somehow had a right to terminate Beecher's 
contract simply because they decided to abandon the 
high-rise concept. The only breach of contract was by 
Defendants, not Beecher. Defendants seek to take ad-
vantage of their own wrong in refusing to approve the 
work done by Beeecher and to thereby escape payment 
for that work. 
Defendants' also incorrectly claim (Pages 4, 8 and 
9) that the supplemental agreement (R. 34, 35, 45, 46) 
of November 10, 1960, constitutes a waiver of Beecher's 
right to be paid for extra work done thereafter by 
Beecher. No such waiver can be found or inferred from 
that supplemental agreement. See discussion on page 
10 of Beecher's original brief. The supplemental agree-
ment simply approved early payment of a part of Beech-
er's architect fee, waived the contractural provision re-
quiring prior approval of Defendants before payment 
for architectual work (since the high-rise concept was 
being abandoned and would not be approved). See dis-
cussion on pages 9-10 of Beecher's original brief. 
Defendants' also apparently fail to realize that the 
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contract for architectual services was made well before 
the work started on the high-rise building concept 
(early 1960); that the supplemental agreement was 
made when the decision was made to abandon the high-
rise concept (Nov. 1960); that the construction contract 
was not made until the building design had been com-
pleted (work commenced about June, 1963 — R. 64-68). 
The fact that the building construction proceeded ac-
cording to schedule is not inconsistent with Plaintiff's 
claim that a construction period of two years was con-
templated when the original and supplemental contracts 
were executed, since the decision to build a two-phase 
project was made after those contracts were signed and 
before the construction contract was executed. The 
construction contract expressly provided for a two-phase 
construction project. Since the decision to complete the 
police facilities prior to commencing construction on 
the courts building (two-phase construction decision) 
was made well after execution of the supplemental 
agreement, that agreement could not constitute a waiver 
of Plaintiff's claims for extra work resulting from the 
decision to construct the project in two phases, which 
decision caused the construction period to take 21/2 times 
the time contemplated when the architectual contracts 
were entered into. 
"POINT I ' 
PLAINTIFF IS CONTRACTUALLY ENTITLED TO 
EXTRA COMPENSATION RESULTING FROM EX-
TENDED CONSTRUCTION PERIOD 
Defendants' point I asserts that since no specific 
time is fixed in the contract within which the architec-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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tural work is to be completed, that as a matter of law 
Plaintiff is not entitled to extra compensation by reason 
of extending construction period 2% times the period 
originally contemplated. In support of that proposition 
counsel for Defendants cite Osterling v. First National 
Bank, 105 A. 633 (Pa. 1918); 5 Am. Jur. 2d Architects, 
Sec. 14 at P. 676, and McDonald Brothers v. Whitney 
County Court, 8 Ky. L. Rep. 874 (1887), 20 ALR 1356. 
Those cases do not support Defendants' position. In the 
Osterling case the court expressly held that since the 
cost of the project was doubled by the extra work, and 
the architect's fee was increased proportionately, that 
the architect was adequately compensated for his extra 
work, and in that case the court pointed out that the 
contract made no provision for extra compensation 
under those circumstances. Our case differs from the 
Osterling case since the cost of the project was not 
increased as a result of the change from a high-rise to 
the present design, so Beecher has not been compensated 
by increased fees from the change; also our contract ex-
pressly provides that defendants will pay extra com-
pensation to Beecher for extra services and expenses: 
"EXTRA SERVICES AND SPECIAL CASES. 
If the Architect is caused extra drafting or other 
expenses due to changes ordered by the Owner, . . . 
he shall be equitably paid for such extra expense 
and the service involved . . ." (R. 29, 4) 
See also Beecher original brief P. 3 and 13. 
In the McDonald Brothers v. Whitney, supra case 
relied upon by Defendants provision had been made for 
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payment of extra compensation to the architect in the 
event of delay, by deducting that compensation from 
the amounts due to the contractor. The court in that 
case also simply found that the owner was not con-
tractually obligated to pay extra compensation to the 
architect by reason of an extended construction period. 
Both cases support the claim of Beecher. A careful read-
ing of both cases indicates that had the architect's con-
tract contained a provision for payment by owner for 
extra work (such as is contained in the contract between 
Beecher and Defendants) that the owners would prob-
ably have been held liable for the extra compensation 
sought. 
An architectural contract is no different from any 
other contract, and it should be construed according to 
the usual rules of construction and evidence. Issues of 
fact remain for trial as to whether or not: 
(a) The supplemental contract constitutes a waiver 
by Beecher of the right to be paid for extra work re-
sulting from the later decision to build the project in 
two phases and to thereby increase the construction 
period from the contemplated 2 year period to 4% years. 
If Defendants deny that the decision to change to a two-
phase construction was made after execution of the 
supplemental agreement, then an issue of fact remains 
for trial concerning that issue. 
(b) Contrary to the assertions by Defendants, no 
claim is made for work done prior to the supplemental 
agreement (Nov. 1960). One claim asserted by Beecher 
(item *2 — see P. 4 of Beecher's original brief) is a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
claim for the cost of preparing new drawings (after the 
agreement of Nov. 1960) to replace the abandoned plans. 
Counsel for Defendants was apparently confused into 
believing that a claim is asserted for work done prior 
to the November 1960 agreement by the fact that some 
costs incurred prior to that date were used in estimating 
the cost of preparing the new plans. An issue of fact 
remains for trial as to whether or not the supplemental 
agreement precludes Beecher from claiming compensa-
tion for redesigning and redrafting the abandoned plans. 
See discussion on pages 9-13 and 16-17 of Beecher's 
original brief. 
(c) See also other issues of fact remaining for trial 
and discussion on pages 15-18 of Beecher's original brief 
herein. 
Defendants' assertions that Becher was paid a "gen-
erous" fee for his work (P. 17 of Defendants' brief); that 
Beecher received extra compensation for extra work 
orders (P. 20 & 22) and received some extra payment to 
reimburse Beecher for extra compensation to one on-
site inspector (P. 18, 19 & 22) are wholly immaterial to 
the issues involved in Beecher's claim for extra com-
pensation for other services, costs and expenses which 
Beecher claims to be entitled to be paid under the terms 
of the contract. Reference to those items appears to be 
an emotional plea which in essence says that the archi-
tectural fees are already high enough so Defendants 
should ignore the contract and simply refuse to pay 
more. Counsel for defendants is not in a position to de-
termine the adequacy of the compensation to be paid to 
Beecher for the architectural work. Defendants and 
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Beecher made that determination when they drafted 
and signed the contracts for architectural work, and the 
only issue now before the court is a determination of 
the amounts owed to Beecher for those services. 
The statement made on page 17 of Defendants' brief 
purporting to restate the terms of the contract between 
Beecher and Defendants concerning circumstances 
where Beecher was to be paid extra compensation are 
incorrect and misleading. Defendants state therein that 
". . . extra compensation was agreed to be paid if: (a) 
Changes were made in approved drawing, (b) . . . (c) 
Expenses were incurred because work designed or spe-
cified on the approved project was abandoned or sus-
pended. Nothing whatever is said in paragraph #4 of 
the contract between the parties which limits the right 
of Beecher to be paid for changes to "approved drawings" 
or to work abandoned on an "approved project/' De-
fendants then go on to argue that since they did not 
approve the abandoned drawings that they were under 
no obligation to pay for them, and by implication that 
since the final drawings were not approved until after 
the decision to build the project in two phases had been 
made that Beecher should not be paid for these claims 
since they were not "approved." If we were to follow 
that reasoning to it's logical conclusion we would neces-
sarily conclude that no rights were vested in Beecher by 
the contract unless the Defendants decided to give him 
those rights by "approving" matters covered by the con-
tract. Such reasoning falls by it's own weight. 
The contract between the parties appointed the Salt 
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Lake City Engineer as Defendants' representative and 
required that Beecher ". . . perform and conduct all 
required services under his direction and supervision 
. . ." (R. 32, Par. 13). The City Engineer worked with 
Beecher for 10 months designing a high-rise project (R. 
286), which constituted acceptance by the Defendants 
of the work being done. Defandants' claim that their 
respective commissions had not "accepted" the work is 
unacceptable. Factual issues concerning waiver, estop-
pel, etc. remain for trial concerning these issues. 
POINT II 
NOVEMBER 1960 AGREEMENT DOES NOT BAR 
BEECHER'S CLAIMS 
Beecher's discussion concerning the terms and effect 
of the original agreements are set forth on pages 9-13 
and 16-18 of Beecher's original brief and will not be 
repeated here. That discussion adequately demonstrates 
that issues of fact remain for trial concerning the effect 
and applicability of that agreement to Beecher's various 
claims. However, a few of the factual statements recited 
under point II in Defendants' brief require further com-
ment. 
Defendants claim that they decided to not approve 
the high-rise work done by Beecher "after seeing the 
preliminary work" (Defendants' brief P. 25). This is 
simply untrue since Defendants representative was 
working daily with Beecher in designing that work, and 
since the Defendants simply changed their mind as to 
the type of structure desired after Beecher had pro-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ceeded in good faith for 10 months. Defendants should 
pay for their change of mind, not Beecher. The only 
reason that the Defendants claim that the work was 
"unsatisfactory" (defendant brief P. 26) is because they 
changed their minds, not because there was anything 
wrong with the work. 
Defendants again assert (P. 26) that they had no 
obligation to pay for the abandoned drawings because 
that work was "unapproved." The contract with Beecher 
expressly requires Defendants to pay for abandoned 
work (R. 29, Par. 4). Defendants would have the Court 
believe that the abandoned drawings were "unaccept-
able" because of some default or misconduct by Beecher, 
when in fact Defendants' representative had approved 
all work on those drawings as they progressed and the 
only reason for abandoning those drawings was because 
Defendants decided not to build a high-rise building. 
In point I, sub-paragraph 2 (page 6-7) of Plaintiffs 
original brief it is pointed out that items #7 and 8 of 
Plaintiff's claim for extra compensation (R. 53-54, 69 
& page 5 of brief) are not disputed, that this work was 
extra work not included in the architects contract, and 
that the Defendants had acknowledge liability for those 
claims (R. 89-90, Par. 7 & 8), but that the court had 
overlooked this admission of liability and had improp-
erly dismissed those claims. In response Defendants 
point out that these services were performed prior to 
October 7, 1966, (Pages 12-13 of Defendants' brief), ap-
parently thereby inferring that they should be barred 
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as having been performed prior to the date of the supple-
mental agreement of November 10, 1960, (R. 34-37). 
Obviously a 1960 agreement could not bar a claim for 
extra work performed in 1966. Either Plaintiff is en-
titled to judgment against Defendants for items #7 and 
8 of their claim (P. 5 of Plaintiff's brief), or an issue 
of fact remains for trial as to whether or not the work 
included in those claims is extra work not required by 
the contract. 
Questions of waiver, estoppel, etc. raised by counsel 
for Defendants in their brief (p. 27-28) are clearly issues 
of fact which require a trial. Defendants' motion is not 
supported by affidavits, etc., so there are no established 
facts to support those claims, and summary judgment 
under those facts to support those claims, and sum-
mary judgment under those circumstances is improper. 
POINT III 
ISSUES OF FACT REMAIN FOR TRIAL ON ITEM 
NO. 6 
Defendants' brief asserts that the taxpayers suit did 
not involve architectural services and accordingly that 
Beecher is not entitled to pay under his contract. The 
lawsuit involved the design of the jail, the adequacy of 
the jail equipment bid, and obviously did involve pri-
marily architectural services. The record is devoid of 
any affidavit or other established and uncontested facts 
which refute Beecher's claim. Beecher's verified claim 
(R. 53) creates an issue of fact for trial and precludes 
summary judgment on this item. 
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........... POINT IV 
ISSUES OF FACT REMAIN FOR TRIAL CON-
CERNING THE TIMELINESS OF FILING OF 
CLAIMS AND OF LAWSUIT. QUESTION OF 
TIMELINESS IS ALSO NOT BEFORE THE COURT 
The district court dismissed only a part of Plain-
tiff's claims, leaving items #3 and 5 of Plaintiff's claim 
for trial (R. 248, 250). All claims filed by Plaintiff were 
included in a single instrument filed with the Defen-
dants (R. 47-59) and a single lawsuit. If the district 
court had determined that Plaintiff's claims or lawsuit 
were untimely the entire lawsuit would have been dis-
missed. Reserving of some claims for trial constitutes 
an unequivocal holding by the district court that the 
claims and lawsuits were filed on a timely basis, or that 
issues of fact remained for trial concerning the timeli-
ness of those claims and of this lawsuit. Defendants did 
not file a cross-appeal as permitted by Rule 74(b), URCP, 
and cannot now appeal to this court from the clear de-
cision of the district court denying their defenses con-
cerning timeliness. The Court simply has no jurisdiction 
to entertain Defendants' claims concerning timeliness 
since they failed to file an appeal to this Court within 
the time required by law. The filing of a timely appeal 
is jurisdictional. Ratliff, Estate of v. Conrad, 19 U. (2d) 
346, 431 P. 2d 571. 
Defendants argue that the services of Beecher were 
completed at an earlier date and that the claim was not 
filed on a timely basis (P. 13-14 P. 34-38), however, De-
fendants admit that they wrote a letter terminating the 
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services of Beecher April 22, 1970, (Exhibit "VII" to 
Plaintiff's complaint, R. 71). The only purpose of such 
a letter would be to terminate employment then exist-
ing. Had it been terminated earlier no such letter would 
have been necessary. If Defendants desire to now im-
peach their own letter an issue of fact remains for trial 
concerning the date upon which the services were com-
pleted or terminated. 
Defendants further argue that the lawsuit was not 
filed within a year after denial of the claim (P. 38-41). 
The record shows to the contrary. Exhibits "IX" (R. 
73) and "X" (R. 74) to Plaintiff's complaint are letters 
from the Defendants denying Plaintiff's claim May 21, 
1970, and July 15, 1970. This lawsuit was filed April 2, 
1971, (R. 1), well within one year after the denial of 
Plaintiff's claim. Defendants' assertions that the claims 
were denied as a matter of law at an earlier date raise 
issues of fact which require a trial in view of Defendants 
letters of denial (R. 73 & 74), including questions of 
waiver, estoppel, etc. 
The record does not disclose the filing of a motion 
for summary judgment, but simply that the Court heard 
the pre-trial on February 22, 1973, at which time it was 
continued to March 5, 1973, (R. 246), and that further 
pre-trial was held March 5, 1973, at which time the 
minute entry recites that "The Court takes the issues 
under advisement." Counsel for Defendants filed mem-
orandum of authorities on questions of whether Plain-
tiff's complaint stated a claim upon which relief could 
be granted (R. 251-254) and on questions of lack of con-
sideration and economic compulsion and duress (R. 255-
258). No memorandum was filed with the district court Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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concerning the questions timeliness now attempted to be 
raised for the first time on appeal, and that question was 
not discussed on the record at the pre-trial hearing (R. 
283-310). The minute entry (R. 248) and order grant-
ing summary judgment (R. 249-250) do not mention the 
new issues concerning the timeliness of the claims or 
lawsuit. Defendants cannot raise the issue of timeliness 
for the first time on appeal. Dolores Uranium Corp. v. 
Jones, 382 P. 2d 883, 14 U. 2d) 280. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court is referred to the summary in it's original 
brief (P. 15-18) where issues of fact requiring trial are 
discussed. This reply brief is filed in order to respond 
to new issues raised and to clarify statements contained 
in the Defendants' brief. 
No motion for summary judgment appears in the 
record or in the transcript of the pre-trial hearing. The 
minute entry reflects that the Court took the issues 
under advisement. (R. 247) Ten months later, and im-
mediately before Judge Wilkins resigned, Judge Wilkins 
granted summary judgment. (R. 248). It appears that 
the delay in ruling, together with the press of trying to 
clear the Court's calendar, may have resulted in an 
incomplete consideration of the issues and an improper 
summary judgment. Issues of fact remain for trial 
which preclude granting of summary judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RONALD C. BARKER 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Attorney for Appellants 
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